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The purpose of this study is to examine the possible local impacts of cap-and-trade climate 
policy on agricultural producers in the Northern Plains.  This study explicitly considers farmer 
behavior with respect to agricultural opportunity in carbon offset provision and ability of 
adaptation to mitigate the production cost impact under a cap-and-trade climate policy.  Based on 
empirically estimated farmer behavior models, a policy simulation with agricultural census data 
identifies farmer acreage enrollment in carbon offset provision, carbon offset supplies and 
revenues, the production cost impacts of carbon prices, and impacts on net farm income and their 
distributions among heterogeneous farmers.  Our analysis find that: 1) farmer ex ante preferences 
in general are biased against participating in carbon credit programs although farmer 
involvement increases with carbon prices; 2) with the fertilizer industry exempted from cap-and-
trade regulation, the production cost impacts would be small, and more than half of the farms or 
farmland would probably gain for a carbon price higher than $10 per metric ton of carbon; and 3) 
the production cost impacts with a capped fertilizer industry would be 2 times higher, and more 
than half of the farms or farmland would lose unless the carbon price could reach beyond $55 per 
metric ton of carbon.  This study sheds some light on agricultural potential to adapt to economy-
wide climate change mitigation while providing a bottom-up economic assessment of the costs 
and benefits of a cap-and-trade climate policy to agricultural producers in the short run.   
 
Keywords: greenhouse gas, cap-and-trade, climate change, agricultural impact, economics, 
carbon offsets. 
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Assessing the Impacts of Cap-and-Trade Climate Policy on Agricultural 
Producers in the Northern Plains: A Policy Simulation with Farmer 
Preferences and Adaptation 
 
1.  Introduction 
Regulating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is of political interest in the U.S.  With the power 
established under the Clean Air Act (Massachusetts v. EPA 2007), the Obama administration has 
already incorporated GHG cap-and-trade (CAT) in its budget plan for 2012-2019 (Scientific 
American 2009).  In June 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed for the first time a 
climate bill titled The American Clean Energy and Security Act (HR 2454) (also known as the 
Waxman-Markey bill) that proposes a more comprehensive GHG CAT program while 
promoting improvement of energy efficiency.  With more than 20 bills introduced in the 110
th 
Congress calling for near-term, specific and mandatory GHG reductions, majority leaders in both 
the House and Senate have stated intentions to pass GHG control legislation in the 111
th 
Congress (Leggett 2009).  U.S. regulation on GHG emissions, probably by a CAT program, 
seems to be inevitable in the near future.       
GHG emission regulation could affect many sectors in the U.S. economy.  Traditional 
wisdom believes that a GHG CAT program in effect introduces a carbon price such that 
economic activities need to pay for their GHG emissions beyond the amounts permitted.  Based 
on a general equilibrium analysis of the U.S economy, studies found that small sectors that are 
emissions-intensive would bear disproportionately large shares of the mitigation costs with the 
energy industries among the foremost (Goettle and Fawcett 2009, Jorgenson et al. 2009).  
Because of the potential economic impacts, many interest groups are seeking to affect the 
development of climate policy in favor of their respective interests.  With pending climate 
legislation, understanding the impacts of GHG regulation becomes critical to designing an 
effective, welfare-improving climate policy that can achieve U.S. policy goals in both energy 
security and climate change mitigation at a minimum cost.   
To the U.S. agricultural sector, what GHG regulation, particularly CAT, means is subject 
to debate with divided views.  For example, Murray et al. (2009) developed a commentary on 2 
 
some previous studies that were considered characterized by a partial, incomplete assessment of 
the impact of a CAT program on agriculture.  These studies, including Francl et al. (1998) and a 
report issued by Doane Advisory Services (2008), emphasized negative impacts from carbon 
prices, asserting that agriculture would suffer due to increase in production costs.  In contrast, 
many resource economists appear more optimistic and believe that GHG CAT could bring many 
benefits that may be sufficient enough to more than offset the negative impact on production 
costs (Peters et al. 2001, Schneider and McCarl 2005, McCarl 2007, Babcock 2009, Murray et al. 
2009, Baker et al. 2010).   
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Office of Chief Economist also conducted a 
preliminary analysis of the effects of GHG CAT on US agriculture (USDA 2009).  Based on an 
EAP June study on the energy price effects of the Waxman-Markey bill (EPA 2009), the USDA 
study analyzed production cost impacts relative to farm income, assuming no technological 
change, no alteration of inputs in agriculture, and no increase in demand for bio-energy resulting 
from higher energy prices.  Acknowledging overestimation of the production cost impacts, it 
concluded that the agricultural sector would have modest costs in the short term and net benefits 
– perhaps significant net benefits – over the long term.  In a testimony to the House 
Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, Energy and Research, McCarl (2009) was more focused 
on the opportunities enabled by a CAT program.  He believed that agriculture could benefit from 
CAT climate legislation but adjustment would be needed for agriculture to obtain these benefits.   
While all these studies or views reflect varying focus on the potential benefits and costs 
of a CAT climate policy, different assumptions on farmer behavior and policy design can affect 
estimation of the benefits and costs, leading to different policy impact assessment.  On the cost 
side, if agriculture is exempted from GHG emission regulation, then the direct agricultural 
impact of CAT boils down to the production cost increase due to rising energy prices to cover 
carbon costs.  With changing and increasing prices for energy-related inputs, will farmers be 
indifferent and still follow the same production practices using the same amount of inputs as 
before the price changes?  If farmers are to reduce their use of energy and energy-related inputs, 
this production adjustment in effect may mitigate the cost impact of carbon prices.  On the 
benefit side, if agriculture is allowed to provide carbon emission offsets in the carbon market, 
then GHG CAT may create income opportunity for farm carbon sequestration or emission 3 
 
reduction in addition to advancing agricultural potential to provide renewable energy and the 
market effect of rising commodity prices.  Similarly, farmer responses to these opportunities and 
their market consequences affect estimation of the potential benefits.   
This study is motivated to develop an economic analysis of the possible impacts of GHG 
CAT on agricultural producers in North Dakota (ND), an important production region in the 
Northern Great Plains.  In this study, we consider a CAT climate policy that exempts agriculture 
from GHG emission regulation while allowing agriculture to provide carbon emission offsets in 
carbon markets.  This study is focused on two possible direct impacts of the policy on net farm 
income: revenue from carbon offset provision and rising production costs due to GHG 
regulation.  It intends to address four policy-relevant questions, including: 1) how farmers would 
respond to on-farm potential to provide marketable carbon emission offsets, 2) what would be 
the production cost impacts of CAT with farmer ability of adaptation, 3) to what extent the 
potential revenue from carbon offset provision could offset the increase in production costs such 
that agriculture would gain from CAT, and 4) how the CAT impact on net farm income would be 
distributed among heterogeneous farmers.           
In this study, we conducted a mailing survey to elicit farmer preferences to participating 
in carbon credit programs to provide marketable carbon offsets.  We used farmer stated 
preference to calibrate a behavior model that can predict the probabilities that farmers of given 
attributes would enroll land in carbon programs for different carbon prices.  We drew on 
economic theory to specify and estimate farmer production costs as a reduced function of energy 
prices, which incorporates farmer ability of adaptation to manage production costs with changing 
energy prices.  We applied the estimated farmer behavior models to agricultural census data to 
simulate farmer acreage enrollment in carbon offset provision, carbon offset supplies and 
revenues, the production cost impacts of carbon prices, and more importantly, impacts on net 
farm income and their distributional effects.  By explicitly considering farmer behavior, this 
study attempts to shed some light on the agricultural potential of adaptation to economy-wide 
climate change mitigation while providing a bottom-up economic assessment of possible local 
impacts of CAT on agricultural producers. 
This study contributes to improving understandings on the agricultural impacts of GHG 
CAT.  First, it provides a local perspective on a CAT climate policy from a major agricultural 4 
 
production region in the U.S. that provides an ideal, specific agricultural setting for examining 
the policy.  Second, it explicitly considers farmer behavior with respect to both carbon offset 
provision and adaptation to manage production costs, both of which affect assessment of the 
impacts of CAT on agriculture.  Third, it accounts for farmer heterogeneity and reveals the 
distributional effects of carbon prices on net farm income.  While existing analyses largely focus 
on broad economic impacts of CAT on agriculture, this study complements the literature by its 
local focus and explicit consideration of farmer preferences, adaptation, and heterogeneity in 
farm production.   
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 summarizes our modeling framework, 
including farmer behavior models and the structure of policy simulation based on the farmer 
behavior models.  Section 3 describes our survey design, elicited farmer preferences to carbon 
offset provision, and other data collected for our analysis.  Section 4 presents econometric 
estimation of the farm behavior models.  Section 5 applies the estimated farmer behavior models 
to simulate the short-term cost and potential benefit of a CAT climate policy on agricultural 
producers.  Section 6 concludes the paper with discussion.         
      
2.  Modeling Framework 
Our method to assess the local agricultural impacts of a CAT climate policy is centered on 
farmer behavior with respect to carbon offset provision and production cost management.  Based 
on farmer behavior modeling and agricultural census data, a policy simulation can be developed 
to account for farmer heterogeneity and to identify the distributional effect of GHG CAT on net 
farm income.    
2.1.  Economic rationale 
To develop an economic analysis of the agricultural impacts of GHG CAT, the key is to 
understand farmer production behavior under the expected changes in market and economic 
conditions attributed to the policy.  One important opportunity for farmers under CAT is the 
potential to reduce farm carbon emissions by adjusting production practices and sell the carbon 
emission reductions as offsets in the carbon market.  Yet, on-farm carbon offset provision is a 5 
 
new concept with which farmers have no experience.  While one could reasonably assume that 
farmers would produce carbon offsets if profitable, it is also fair to pay attention to the 
possibility that farmers might not always be willing to yield their flexibility in production 
management to regulation in exchange for carbon revenue from a volatile market while bearing 
certain transaction costs.  Farmers may be risk-averse and may not be fully responsive to new 
market opportunities like carbon offset provision, which requires certain production practices 
with a commitment of at least 5 years.  The extent of farmer participation in carbon offset 
provision will affect the benefit farmers could receive from CAT.  Farmer preferences to provide 
carbon offsets remain an open question with many speculations that have not been addressed in 
the existing literature, though.   
Farmer ability of production cost management is equally important as well.  Economists 
have long recognized that farmers are responsive and can adapt to mitigate at certain degree any 
negative impacts caused by policy or biophysical or economic conditions that affect production 
costs or benefits.  Indeed, farmer adaptation is the foundation for most economic assessments of 
the potential impact of climate change on agriculture (Mendelsohn et al. 1994, Antle 1996, 
Mendelsohn and Neumann 1999).  With GHG CAT increasing prices for energy-related inputs, a 
profit-maximizing farmer will adjust production to reduce his consumption of these inputs 
substituted by other inputs with relatively low prices.  While increased production costs may be 
expected resulting from CAT, farmer adaptation can mitigate the production cost impacts of 
carbon prices.  To what extent farmers can adjust their production with increasing prices for 
energy-related inputs directly affects estimation of the production cost impacts of CAT. 
A third challenge for analyzing the local impacts of GHG CAT is the heterogeneity 
among farms.  It is well known that U.S. agriculture is characterized by high heterogeneity in 
farm production.  Given that not all the farms are the same in terms of their production attributes, 
it is likely that some farms would gain while others might lose under a CAT climate policy.  
While estimation of the impact in aggregate may provide useful information on the economic 
efficiency of the policy, decision-makers are also concerned about its distributional effect and the 
possible magnitudes of economic gains or losses for individual farmers.  Given the larger 
number of farms with high heterogeneity, identifying the distribution of the policy impact among 6 
 
farms is important and can be approached by statistical simulation with approximation if 
modeling hundreds of thousands of individual farms is impossible. 
2.2.  Modeling farmer decision on carbon offset provision 
To model farmer decision to provide carbon emission offsets, we use the discrete choice 
method, which is a popular approach increasingly used to study people preferences by observing 
their choice behavior (McFadden 2001).  Consider the farmer decision of whether or not to 
participate in carbon credit programs to provide carbon offsets.  If farmers are profit-
maximizing, then farmer decision on carbon offset provision can be modeled by examining how 
participation in carbon credit programs would affect farmer profit.   
With an active carbon market, farmer profit may be expressed as  
) , ( ) ( y C y p y c Q PQ               (1)   
where P represents the vector of market prices for agricultural commodities, Q denotes the 
vector of production outputs for these commodities, y denotes the amount of carbon offsets 
produced, and C(Q, y) is the production cost for commodity output Q with carbon offset yield y, 
and pc is the price for carbon.  Because producing carbon offsets usually involves changing 
practices or land use, the production outputs of commodities Q and their production cost C may 
be affected by carbon offset yield y.   
For profit-maximizing farmers to produce carbon offsets (i.e., y > 0), the Kuhn-Tucker 
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Denote C
Q as the production cost increment attributed to the commodity output effect of 
changing production practices for producing carbon offsets and C
y as the cost increment 
directly linked to the provision of carbon offsets.  For a positive carbon yield y > 0, the Kuhn-
Tucker condition (2) in discrete case can be written as  7 
 
 = pc – [–(PQ – C
Q) + C
y] > 0       (3) 
The expression (3) indicates that profit-maximizing farmers will produce carbon offsets if the 
marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost including both the opportunity cost of 
commodity production and the direct cost of carbon offset production.  This condition establishes 
our theoretical foundation for specifying and estimating a farmer behavior model with respect to 
on-farm provision of carbon emission offsets.    
  The Kuhn-Tucker condition (3) shows that farmer provision of carbon offsets can be 
predicted if its opportunity cost and production cost are known for a given carbon price and 
farmers are profit-maximizing.  Although individual farmers may have their own perceptions 
about the private costs of producing offsets on their land, these private costs are not observed in 
general.  To measure farmer private costs for producing carbon offsets, we introduce an index 
function  
   ) (J C C              (4)   
where J is a vector of farmer observable attributes,  ) (J C represents the expected private costs for 
producing carbon offsets as perceived by farmers, and  is a random error accounting for 
unobserved or stochastic factors that affect farmer perception of the private cost.  By this index 
function, we assume that the expected farmer private cost for producing carbon offsets  ) (J C
depends on observable farm attributes J.  These attributes can include land use, production 
practices, land ownership, land location, and farmer demographics and attitudes to climate 
change legislation.  Substituting (4) into to (3) yields 
      ) (J C pc           (5) 
With this model setting, the probability that a farmer j will provide carbon offsets is 
)) ( ( Pr ) 0 ( Pr ) ( Pr J C p carbon c j j j j j             (6) 
Assume that the cumulative density function of j can be approximated by a logistic function.   
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So the probability of farmer j observed behavior on carbon offset provision can be expressed as 
Prj = Prj
Z(1-Prj)
(1-Z), where Z is a 0-1 variable indicating farmer j decision of whether or not to 
participate in carbon credit program to provide offsets.  If the choices of n farmers are observed, 
the farmer behavior model can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function of the 
observed choices of n farmers:   
    
n
j j j j Z Z carbon )] Pr 1 ln( ) 1 ( ) ln(Pr [ ) Pr(
    (8)
 
2.3.  Modeling farmer adaptation in production cost management  
In this study, we focus on farmer variable production costs to capture their ability of 
adaptation in production cost management in response to changing input prices.  In economic 
theory, the production cost function can be specified as C = C(Q, W) with output vector Q and 
input price vector W.  This function reveals how the production cost of a profit-maximizing 
agent varies with input prices, and it incorporates and reflects production adjustment in optimum 
that minimizes the production cost for different input prices.  Consequently, modeling farmer 
adaptation in production cost management may be approached by identifying the production cost 
function of farmers.       
Assume the maximum agricultural output per unit land is fixed over a finite period.  On a 
per unit land basis with fixed output, farmer production cost function may be written as C = 
C(W).  Because we consider variable production costs and because agricultural production relies 
directly and indirectly on energy inputs, farmer variable production costs for per unit land may 
be regarded econometrically as a reduced function of energy prices, i.e., C = C(we).  We expect 
that farmer reduced production cost function, if estimated using historical observations on how 
variable production costs have varied with energy prices, would capture farmer adaptation 
behavior in face of soaring and volatile prices for energy and energy-related inputs.  As GHG 
CAT is expected to impose a carbon cost on energy consumption, the production cost impact of 
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How to specify farmer reduced production cost function is an empirical question.  We 
hypothesize that variable production costs for per unit land in reduced form be a quadratic 
function of energy prices, i.e., 
2
2 1 0 e e b C w b w b             (10) 
This hypothesis is based on economic rationale on production and farmer ability to manage 
production costs within a finite period.  When prices for energy-related inputs increase with 
rising energy prices, farmers may initially be able to mitigate a corresponding increase in 
production costs by reducing consumption of those energy-related inputs via production 
adjustment or better management.  Farmer ability to mitigate the production cost impact of rising 
input prices, however, is not unlimited within a finite period.  The increase in energy prices 
eventually will lead to higher production costs.  Consequently, farmer production costs for per 
unit land may decrease initially before increasing with rising energy prices.  The specified farmer 
production cost function in its reduced form leads to the production cost impact of carbon price 
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This equation incorporates farmer ability of adaptation in production cost management with 
rising energy prices. 
2.4.  Statistical policy simulation  
Based on the above farmer behavior models, a statistic simulation with county-level 
agricultural census data can estimate the distributional effects of carbon prices on net farm 
income.  We first classify farmers into different types by their production attributes vector J.  We 
assume that agricultural production is homogeneous among farmers of a same type with the same 
production attributes and heterogeneous across different farmer types with varying production 
attributes.  Once a farmer is identified by his production vector J, we can predict his provision of 10 
 
carbon emission offsets and the production cost impact for a carbon price.  In each county, there 
are many types of farmers with varying production attributes vector J; and the distribution of 
farmers by type differs among counties.  With agricultural census data available to estimate the 
distribution of farmer types for each county, we can simulate the distributional effects of carbon 
prices on net farm income.         
 Consider a farmer type described by production vector J.  Denote a(J) as the vector of 
farmland acreages in different land use operated by farmers of type J.  With Pr(J, pc) 
representing the vector of probabilities of participating in different carbon credit programs, the 
amounts of land in different use that farmers of type J would enroll in carbon programs to 
produce carbon offsets can be calculated as Pr(J, pc)a(J).  Suppose the probability distribution 
of farmer type J in county i is Fi(J).  If the county i has a total number of Ni farmers, the county-
level acreages used to produce carbon offsets for a given carbon price w can be estimated as: 

J
J J a J Pr i i i c N F p ) ( ) ( ) , (
        (12)
 
The state total acreages of farmland for carbon offset provision would be 

i
i i i c N F a p
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If each acre of farmland in different carbon programs can sequester α metric ton of carbon, the 
state-level total carbon supply can be calculated as 

i
i i i c N F a p
J
J J J Pr α ) ( ) ( ) , (
      (14) 
For a carbon price pc, the total revenue from carbon offset provision in a state would be 

i
i i i c c N F a p p
J
J J J Pr α ) ( ) ( ) , (
      (15) 
To examine the distributional effects of carbon prices on net farm income, we compare 
the revenue from carbon offset provision with the production cost impact under different carbon 
prices for all farmer types.  Consider a farmer with production profit  = R – C, where R 
represents farm revenue and C, as before, is the total production cost.  With an emerging carbon 11 
 
market, we assume that farmers produce carbon emission offsets by enrolling land in different 
carbon credit programs that their land are qualified for and that would not require shifts among 
land use incurring significant opportunity costs.  In this case, the impacts on net farm income of 
carbon prices can be calculated as the increased revenue from provision of carbon offsets minus 
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Note that this calculation considers the short-term rather than long-term market equilibrium 
effect of introducing a carbon price in the economy.  The state-level aggregate impact on net 
farm income d would be 
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3.  Farmer Preference Survey and Data 
To calibrate the farmer behavior model regarding carbon offset provision, we conducted a 
mailing survey to elicit farmer preferences to the carbon opportunity under CAT.  The survey 
questionnaire is composed of three sections.  Section 1 is intended to elicit farmer willingness to 
enroll in carbon credit programs.  In the survey, we present fiver carbon credit programs 
including conservation tillage, cropland conversion to grass, rangeland management, tree 
planting, and methane management project (Table 1).  Section 2 is designed with questions to 
collect information on farmer social economic background and their attitudes to climate change 
and legislation.  In section 3, questions are raised on farmer current production practices.  These 
questions focus on crop types and acreages, seeding rates, yields, tillage practices, crop rotation, 
gasoline and diesel consumption, and fertilizer and pesticide application.  Data collected by 
sections 2 and 3 are intended to be used as surrogates to measure farmer perceived private costs 
for producing carbon offsets on their land.   12 
 
  The survey was administered by the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) field office in North Dakota.  We designed six different versions of survey 
questionnaires to incorporate different levels of the carbon price ranging from $5/metric ton to 
$70/metric ton (and thus varying profitability for carbon program enrollment).  For each version 
of the questionnaire, a sample of 500 farmers across ND was randomly selected from the USDA 
NASS database to take the survey.  The survey questionnaires were mailed out on January 15, 
2010, followed by a postcard reminder after two weeks.  A total of 316 survey questionnaires 
were returned.  Among those returned, 35 were not filled out, and the remaining 281 had at least 
one question answered.         
Other data needed for this study include production costs, total acreages of planted 
cropland and rangeland, and energy prices.  These data are used to estimate farmer reduced 
production cost function.  Although county-level time series of annual variable production costs 
and acreages of production farmland are desirable for our analysis, they are not available.  
Instead, we collected state-level annual variable production costs and acreages of production 
farmland over the period from 1968 to 2008 (USDA ERS 2010).  We use variable production 
costs rather than full production costs including land rent and farm overhead because variable 
production costs are more closely related to input prices that reflect energy costs.  We divided 
variable production costs by acreages of production farmland to get variable production costs for 
per unit land.   
We collected prices data for two major energy sources directly or indirectly consumed in 
agricultural production.  These energy sources include natural gas and crude oil.  Natural gas 
accounts for the majority of the production costs of fertilizers, which are an important input for 
agriculture.  Crude oil is the major ingredient of diesel and gasoline, which are directly or 
indirectly consumed in agricultural production operation.  Natural gas prices collected are 
nominal prices for the industrial sector.  Crude oil prices are combined nominal refiner 
acquisition costs of domestic and imported crude oil.  All energy prices are annual averages for 
the period of 1968-2008 from the U.S. Department of Energy Energy Information 
Administration (EIA 2010).  Figure 1 depicts the variable production costs for per unit land and 
energy prices.    
                13 
 
4.  Model Estimation 
This section presents our model estimation results for farmer decision on carbon offset provision 
and farmer reduced production cost function.  We estimated the farmer behavior models by using 
the computer program Matlab.   
4.1.  Farmer decision on carbon offset provision 
Table 2 defines the independent variables included in our discrete choice model (8) of 
farmer decision to participate in carbon credit programs.  We estimated the discrete choice model 
by maximizing the log-likelihood function (9).  Table 3 presents the modeling results, including 
estimates of the elasticities of the likelihood that farmers would enroll land in carbon credit 
programs with respect to different factors.  As demonstrated by Table 3, the binary logit model 
fits farmer choices reasonably well.  Indeed, it correctly predicts 75% of farmer choices in the 
survey sample.   
  Many factors can affect farmer decision to provide carbon emission offsets.  As expected, 
available carbon prices could significantly increase the odds of farmer enrollment.  Farmer 
current land use practices, land tenure, age, and attitudes toward climate change and legislation 
could also increase the probability of carbon program participation.  Specifically, if a farmer has 
land in CRP or manages rangeland, owns cropland, is less than 45 years old, is concerned about 
climate change, and supports climate change legislation, he will be more likely to participate in 
carbon credit programs to provide carbon offsets.      
Interestingly, farmers in general are biased against carbon program participation as 
indicated by the estimated negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable denoting 
carbon program enrollment.  From the perspective of farmer profit-maximizing behavior, the 
negative coefficient implies a threshold level for the private costs perceived by farmers for 
enrolling in carbon programs.  Farmers would consider to participate in carbon programs, only if 
the potential benefit exceeds the threshold of private costs, which depends on farmers production 
attributes.  The cost threshold may be attributed to farmer perceptions of uncertainties associated 
with program enrollment or simply the loss of flexibility in land use and management with a 5 
year commitment once enrolled in the carbon program.  It may also reflect the option value that 14 
 
farmers might enjoy by not entering any programs with binding contracts on their land use 
practices.   
To examine the effects of different factors on farmer decision, Table 3 also reports in the 
fourth column the elasticities of the probability of farmer enrollment in carbon programs.   
Specifically, ownership of cropland has the strongest effect that increases the probability of 
carbon program participation by approximately 68%.  The effects of farmer age, engagement in 
rangeland management and CRP, farming experience, and farmer attitude to climate change are 
also sizable that increase the probability of carbon program participation by 58%, 56%, 51%, 
43%, and 37%, respectively.  As to the effect of carbon prices, Table 4 shows that the probability 
of carbon program enrollment on average would increase 0.54% for a 1% increase in the carbon 
price at $34/metric ton.   
4.2.  Farmer reduced production cost function 
Our empirical estimation of farmer reduced production cost function reveals a quadratic 
relationship between variable production costs on a per acre basis and energy prices.  As 
demonstrated by Table 4, all the estimated coefficients for the independent variables are 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The adjusted R square statistic indicates that energy prices can 
account for up to 91% of the variation in variable production costs for the considered time 
period.  This result is consistent with the visualization of the trends of variable production costs 
for per unit land and energy prices illustrated by Figure 1.   
Figure 2 depicts the reduced production cost function with energy prices.  It is interesting 
to note how variable production costs for per unit land vary differentially with prices for crude 
oil and for natural gas.  As illustrated by Figure 2, the distribution of variable production costs 
for per unit land appears to be a U shaped curve with respect to crude oil prices, which is in 
contrast with an inverse U shaped curve with respect to natural gas prices.  Table 4 confirms the 
varying relationships.  This result suggests differential marginal cost effects between energy 
sources: for natural gas, it is positive and decreasing; for crude oil, it is negative and increasing.   
The estimated production cost function has important implications on farmer 
vulnerability or ability to adapt to the price impacts of different energy sources.  When crude oil 
prices are low, agricultural consumption of crude oil may be extensive with low energy 15 
 
efficiency.  Consequently, when crude oil prices rise, farmers may be able to easily cut crude oil 
consumption by improving energy efficiency so as to mitigate its production cost impact.  
However, farmer ability to mitigate the cost impact of energy prices appears not as strong for 
natural gas as for crude oil.  Farmer may see increased production costs with rising natural gas 
prices.  Because agricultural consumption of natural gas is indirectly through fertilizer use and 
because fertilizer costs account for a sizable portion of agricultural production costs, the above 
result seems to imply that fertilizer consumption in the U.S. is relatively efficient such that 
farmers has limited ability to mitigate the production cost impact of any increase in natural gas 
prices.                
With a quadratic production cost function, the marginal cost impact of energy prices 
depends on the level of energy prices in the base year considered.  In this study, the base year to 
examine the CAT impact is 2009.  Figure 2 shows how the 2009 production cost and energy 
prices compare to those in other years.  At the 2009 price level, Figure 2 suggests that the 
marginal impact on production costs of energy prices is limited for crude oil, which is less than 
for natural gas.    
 
5.  Policy Simulation 
Based on the estimated farmer behavior models, we conducted a statistical simulation with 
agricultural census data to estimate farmer acreage enrollment in carbon offset provision, carbon 
supply and revenue, production cost impact with farmer adaptation, and impact on ND farm 
income for varying carbon prices.  Table 5 summarizes the 2007 ND agricultural census data for 
the production attributes used to stratify farmers in our policy simulation.  A total of 768 farmer 
types (or vector J) was identified and used in simulation. 
5.1.  Acreage enrollment in carbon offset provision and carbon supply 
To simulate county-level farmer responses to the carbon market requires information of 
not only farmer production attributes but also the available amount of land that has the capacity 
to produce carbon offsets.  The estimated farmer choice model quantitatively links farmer 
production attributes to the probability of participating in carbon credit programs, while the total 16 
 
acreage of farmland that a farmer would enroll in carbon programs depends on the amount of 
land qualified for the available carbon programs.  As farmland capacity to provide carbon offsets 
is measured by the difference in carbon net fluxes associated with different land use and 
management practices, the amount of land potentially qualified for carbon credit programs 
depends on its use and management history and the target carbon program.  Consistent with our 
survey on farmer preferences, we consider the carbon credit programs administered by NFU 
(except methane projects) as available options to simulate farmer acreage enrollment.  The 
current land use and management determines potentially available amounts of farmland qualified 
for individual carbon credit programs.   
           In this study, we consider five types of land use and management that cover the majority 
of farmland with carbon offset provision potential and that are incorporated in farmer production 
attributes with available agricultural census data.  These land use and management types include 
harvested cropland, cropland used only for pasture or grazing, cropland on which all crops failed 
or were abandoned, cropland in cultivated summer fallow, permanent pasture and rangeland, and 
land in conservation.  We consider conservation as a land use type because conservation 
programs (such as CRP) has implications on opportunity costs and allowed land use by their 
enrollment rules and land management requirements.  We use conservation land here to collect 
all marginal land that is not covered by the other land use types and that may have high potential 
for certain carbon credit programs such as tree planting.      
Not all land in their current use are equally qualified for the carbon credit programs.  
Table 6 summarizes our mapping of farmland with its current land use into each carbon credit 
program.  While different assumptions can be made for the potentially available amount of land 
for each carbon program, Table 6 assumes that farmers enroll their land in a way that does not 
incur much opportunity costs while reducing potential uncertainties and risks associated with 
program enrollment.  As different carbon credit programs are targeted at different land use types 
and management practices, we assume that the considered carbon prices would not be sufficient 
to cause shifts among land use except for changes in management practices entailed by the target 
suitable carbon program.   
As listed in Table 6, harvested cropland is considered only for conservation tillage.  This 
is based on the assumption that harvested cropland represents prime cropland for farming and, if 17 
 
converted to solely produce carbon offsets, would incur high opportunity costs as well as loss of 
option value if it is costly to put it back to crop farming.  As not all harvested cropland might be 
suitable for conservation tillage and some cropland might have adopted conservation tillage 
already, the acreage of harvested cropland may represent the upper bound of available land for 
conservation tillage.  Cropland failed or abandoned and cropland in cultivated summer fallow 
cover land with lower quality for farming than harvested cropland but are not qualified for CRP.  
These land use types may be good candidates for cropland conversion to grass while retaining 
the flexibility of being used for crop farming.  For cropland used only for pasture or grazing and 
permanent pasture and rangeland, the rangeland management program can be a good option 
without involving major land use change.  With a similar long term commitment and attracting 
carbon prices, tree planting may represent a promising use competing with CRP for current CRP 
land once they are released. 
  Table 7 presents our simulation results on farmer acreage enrollment in carbon credit 
programs and amounts of carbon sequestered.  As expected, the acreage of farmland enrolled in 
carbon programs increases with carbon prices.  Table 7 shows that the total acreage in carbon 
programs expands from around 8.5 million to 23 million when the carbon price rises from $5 to 
$70 per metric ton of carbon.  While all carbon programs see increased farmland enrollment with 
rising carbon prices, their contributions to the total acreage are uneven across programs.  
Conservation tillage constitutes nearly half of the farmland in carbon offset provision, and its 
contribution increases from 45% to 52% with carbon prices.  Although accounting for around 
42% of the acreage in carbon programs for a carbon price of $5/metric ton, rangeland 
management contributes less than conservation tillage with a decreasing share as the carbon 
price rises.  Cropland conversion to grass accounts for a small share (2-3%) of the enrolled 
farmland and its contribution goes up for a high carbon price.  Farmland enrolled in tree planting 
makes up around 10% of the total land enrolled, and its percentage decreases with carbon prices.  
  The total amount of carbon offsets increases from 3.3 million metric ton to 9.1 million 
metric ton as the carbon price rises from $5 to $70 per metric ton of ton.  The share of the 
contribution from each program varies.  Conservation tillage still is the major source for 
provided carbon offsets with its share ranging from 46% to 51%, which is consistent with their 
acreage contribution.  In contrast, rangeland management provides only 10-13% of carbon 18 
 
offsets although its acreage contribution accounts for 35-42%.  Tree planting and cropland 
conversion to grass provide, respectively, about 31-34% and 7% of the total provided carbon 
offsets, more than their acreage contributions.    
  In all, conservation tillage and tree planting represent the major source for potential 
carbon offset supply in ND.  Although conservation tillage may not sequester as much carbon as 
tree planting does, it can be applied to harvested cropland - the majority of farmland - without 
incurring significant opportunity costs.  The acreage available for planting tree may be limited 
due to significant conversion costs, uncertainties in carbon markets, or loss of option value.  Yet 
the large amount of carbon that can potentially be sequestered in tree makes tree planting also a 
significant option for carbon offset provision.  Both rangeland management and cropland 
conversion to grass deserve consideration by their sizable amounts of carbon offset provision 
potential without incurring significant opportunity costs.    
5.2.  CAT Impact on farm income and distributional effect  
Table 8 summarizes the impact of carbon prices on production costs for ND farms.  Note 
that the estimates of energy price increases relative to the 2009 levels were based on the carbon 
contents of energy sources without considering the market equilibrium effect of carbon prices.  
As the carbon cost for energy consumption is likely to be shared jointly between energy 
producers and consumers, the estimated energy price increase represents an upper bound for the 
price impact of carbon pricing.  However, given that energy consumption is less elastic than 
energy supply, those estimates are likely to be close to those accounting for the market 
equilibrium price effect.    
As illustrated by Table 8, carbon pricing appears to have a relatively stronger effect on 
prices for natural gas than for crude oil.  The differential effects between natural gas and crude 
oil tend to be more prominent when the carbon price is high.  For a carbon price of $5/metric ton, 
prices for natural gas and crude oil both increase 1% relative to their 2009 levels.  In contrast, if 
the carbon price is $70/metric ton, the natural gas price will increase by 19% while the crude oil 
price will increase by 14% relative to their 2009 levels.   
Historical observations have revealed that farmers are less able to mitigate the production 
cost impact of a price increase for natural gas as compared to for crude oil.  Farmer vulnerability 19 
 
to natural gas prices, combined with the stronger effect of carbon costs on natural gas prices, 
suggests that farmers would suffer more severe cost impact for any price increase for natural gas 
than for crude oil.  Indeed, estimates of the production cost impact confirm the reasoning.  
Agricultural consumption of natural gas is indirectly through fertilizer use.  If the fertilizer 
industry is exempted from CAT regulation, the production cost impact will come largely from 
the consumption of crude oil, with an estimated cost increase ranging from $0.54 to $7.62 per 
acre (or a 0.69% to 9.69% increase relative to the variable production costs for per unit land in 
2009) for a carbon price between $5 and $70 per metric ton of carbon.  However, if the fertilizer 
industry is capped under CAT, the production cost impact for ND farmers will be 2 times higher, 
with an estimate cost increase ranging between $1.14 and $15.99 per acre (or a 1.45% to 20.34% 
increase relative to the variable production costs for per unit land in 2009) for the same range of 
carbon prices.           
Figure 3 compares aggregate revenue from carbon offset provision and production cost 
impact for ND farms.  As demonstrated by Figure 3, if the fertilizer industry is capped under 
CAT, the production cost impact will exceed the carbon revenue unless the carbon price is 
greater than $55 per metric ton of carbon.  As the carbon revenue is not sufficient to offset the 
increase in production costs for a carbon price below $55/metric ton, ND farms in aggregate 
would suffer a loss from CAT.  However, if the fertilizer industry is exempted from CAT, the 
production cost impact on ND farms would be much smaller.  In this case, for any carbon prices 
greater than $10/metric ton, the carbon revenue more than offset the increase in production costs 
such that ND farms in aggregate would gain from CAT by participating in carbon credit 
programs.  It is worth noting that the production cost impacts were estimated relative to the 2009 
ND production costs for different carbon prices.  These estimates may vary depending on the 
base year selected as the comparison benchmark.      
The impact of CAT on individual farms can be different, depending on specific farmer 
attributes including their production practices.  Some farmers may have a large amount of idle 
land or land in conservation with only a small portion in production.  These farmers may benefit 
from CAT by participating in carbon credit programs while not paying much for production cost 
increase.  Other farmers may have land mainly in production, and would be severely affected by 
production cost increase with limited revenue from carbon offset provision, particularly if the 20 
 
opportunity cost to produce carbon offsets is high for these farmers.  Figures 4 and 5 depict the 
cumulative distributions of net farm profits by farm and by acreage for different carbon prices 
and CAT regulation on the fertilizer industry.    
One type of information delivered by the cumulative distributions of net farm profits is 
the percentage of farms or the proportion of total acreage that would suffer a loss from CAT.  If 
the fertilizer industry is capped, as demonstrated by panel a in Figure 4, around 73% of ND 
farms will incur a loss if the carbon price is $5 per metric ton.  The percentage of farms with a 
non-positive net profit is reduced from 73% to 41% if the carbon price is $65 instead of $5 per 
metric ton of carbon.  If the fertilizer industry is exempted from CAT, panel b in Figure 4 shows 
that the percentage of farms that will suffer a loss falls dramatically as compared to panel a for 
each carbon price.  For a low carbon price of $5/metric ton, 69% instead of 73% of ND farms 
will be negatively affected by CAT.  For a high carbon price of up to $65/metric ton, the 
percentage of ND farms that will see negative net farm profits drops from 41% with a capped 
fertilizer industry to 14% if the fertilizer industry is exempted.  Both carbon prices and fertilizer 
industry regulation significantly affect the distributional effect of CAT among heterogeneous 
farmers.         
The distributions of net farm profits may be different by acreage than by farm as 
individual farmers may operate different amounts of farmland.  The distributional effect by 
acreage is equally important because a large portion of farmland acreage might still gain even if 
a large percentage of farms suffered a loss for a given carbon price.  Figure 5, however, does not 
show dramatically different distributions for net farm profits by acreage than by farm.  If the 
fertilizer industry is capped under CAT, the proportion of land by acreage that will suffer a loss 
ranges from 88% for a carbon price of $5/metric ton to 50% for a carbon price of $65/metric ton, 
little higher than the proportions by farm.  If the fertilizer industry is exempted from CAT, the 
proportion of land by acreage that will suffer a loss drops, respectively, to 57% and 15% for a 
carbon price at low of $5/metric ton and at high of $65/metric ton.  In this case, however, the 
proportions of land by acreage that will suffer a loss are slightly lower than those by farm.         
The cumulative distributions of net farm profits, either by farm or by acreage, also show 
the magnitudes of possible economic gains or losses for ND farms.  As illustrated by Figures 4 
and 5, for a carbon price between $5 and $65 per metric ton of carbon, the economic loss on a 21 
 
per acre basis ranges between 0 and -$15 with the fertilizer industry capped or between 0 and -$8 
with the fertilizer industry exempted from CAT.  However, the effects of the carbon prices are 
not symmetric between economic gains and losses. The economic gain from CAT can increase 
dramatically relative to the economic loss with rising carbon prices.  Both Figures 4 and 5 show 
that, the economic gain for some farms can reach up to $80 per acre for a carbon price of 
$65/metric ton, which is in contrast with a maximum economic loss of around $15 or $8 per acre 
depending on CAT regulation on the fertilizer industry.  The asymmetric effects of carbon prices 
reflect farmer capacity of adaptation to manage production costs while benefiting from providing 
marketable carbon emission offsets. 
 
6.  Conclusion and Discussion 
This study is motivated to examine the possible local impacts of a CAT climate policy on 
agricultural producers in a Northern Plains region.  It draws on economic theory and the existing 
literature attempting to develop an economically sound analysis of possible CAT impacts, 
particularly revenue from provision of carbon emission offsets and the production cost impact of 
carbon pricing.  It focuses on farmer production behavior and explicitly considers farmer 
preferences to provide carbon offsets, adaptation to manage production costs, and heterogeneity 
in production attributes.  Based on empirically estimated farmer behavior models, a statistical 
simulation with agricultural census data provides important implications on agricultural potential 
to adapt to climate change mitigation and capacity building to improve agricultural adaptation to 
climate policy. 
Farmers are reluctant ex ante to participate in carbon sequestration.  With agriculture 
exempted from regulation on GHG emissions, CAT creates opportunities for farmers to make 
profits by providing carbon emission offsets.  Based on our survey, however, we found that 
farmers in general are biased against participating in carbon credit programs.  This result may be 
attributed to farmer unfamiliarity with the concept of carbon offset provision and their perceived 
private costs of farm management to produce carbon offsets while maintaining commodity 
production.  Indeed, it was quite common that survey respondents expressed their concerns over 
regulation on farm management and loss of control of farmland implied by participating in 22 
 
carbon programs.  Better education and extension to disseminate on-farm potential to provide 
carbon emission offsets are needed for agriculture to adapt to societal climate change mitigation.  
Nonetheless, conservation tillage and tree planting appear promising to play a major role in the 
Northern Plains region to contribute a large portion of carbon emission offsets without incurring 
significant opportunity costs.   
  Farmers have the ability to mitigate the production cost impact of a CAT climate policy.  
Our theory-driven, production cost approach based on historical observations reveal that farmers 
can effectively manage their operation costs to mitigate the impact of energy price increase, 
possibly by improving production efficiency.  However, farmer ability of production cost 
management varies depending on specific energy sources and the level of energy prices.  Our 
study confirms, from a local perspective, existing findings that CAT has limited impact on 
agricultural production costs (see USDA 2010).  With their ability to manage production costs, 
farmers may gain from CAT by optimal farm management to produce both food and carbon 
offsets.  System design and integration are needed to reconstruct agricultural production to better 
adapt to societal movement to an energy-efficient, low-carbon economy.    
    Specific policy design can affect the agricultural impact of GHG CAT.  While fertilizer 
costs make up an important portion of farmer production expenditures, a CAT policy with an 
exempted fertilizer industry could dramatically reduce its cost impact on agriculture.  On a per 
acre basis, the production cost impact on ND farms averages 2 times higher with a capped 
fertilizer industry as compared to a policy that exempts the fertilizer industry.  In aggregate, with 
an exempted fertilizer industry, revenue from carbon offset provision would be greater than the 
production cost impact for a carbon price over $10/metric ton for ND farms even if farmers were 
in general reluctant to participate in carbon sequestration.  Without the exemption on the 
fertilizer industry, the carbon price needs to reach at least $55/metric ton for ND farms to break 
even with carbon offset revenue offsetting increased production costs.  A policy design with a 
schedule to gradually phase out the exemption on the fertilizer industry may help softly land the 
U.S. agricultural sector with government efforts in climate change mitigation.       
  The impact of CAT on ND farm income is unevenly distributed.  With the fertilizer 
industry exempted, the CAT impact on production costs would be small.  Most farms or the 
majority (> 50%) of farmland acreage in ND would probably gain for a carbon price over $20 23 
 
per metric ton of carbon with farmer ex ante preferences to carbon offset provision.  With the 
fertilizer industry being capped, the CAT impact on production costs would be bigger.  Most 
farms or the majority of farmland acreage in ND would lose for any carbon prices probably 
below $50/metric ton.  In both cases, on a per acre basis, the economic losses are limited as 
compared to the economic gains across farms.     
  While we strive to develop an economically sound analysis of some of the possible local 
impacts of CAT on agriculture, this study like many others has some caveats that arise mainly 
due to our local focus in research scale.  First, in this study, we did not consider two other effects 
that can affect the assessment of a CAT climate policy.  Some existing studies indicated that 
CAT might have economy-wide market consequences including increased demand for bio-
energy feedstock and rising prices for agricultural commodities, both of which could increase 
farm income (Schneider and McCarl 2005, Murray et al. 2009).  To quantify these two market 
equilibrium effects requires an equilibrium analysis at the national scale which is beyond the 
scope of this study.  We understand that it is highly challenging to accurately quantify the 
benefits from both effects with complex market dynamics interacting with farmer behavior and 
US energy and agricultural policies, including the indirect land use effect.  Focused on 
agricultural potential to provide carbon offsets without considering the other two market effects, 
this study likely underestimates the benefit that GHG CAT would bring to agriculture.  
  Second, this study did not consider the cost impact of carbon pricing on inputs that are 
not energy intensive.  GHG CAT can have an economy-wide effect by introducing a carbon cost.  
Prices for agricultural inputs that are not energy intensive might be affected as well due to the 
carbon footprint of these inputs.  In this sense, our estimation of the production cost impact of 
carbon pricing represents a lower bound on the true cost impact.  Yet, with our reduced 
production cost function, we remain skeptical on the possibility that the cost impact of carbon 
pricing on non-energy intensive inputs such as machinery would outnumber that for energy-
intensive inputs.  Indeed, the reduced production cost function of energy prices explains 91% of 
the variation of observed production costs over the past 4 decades.  Based on an economically 
sound approach accounting for farm adaptation, our estimation of the production cost impact 
appears reasonable while might underestimate the true impact by a small margin.  In addition, we 
did not consider the pass-through of the production cost increase to consumers in the form of 24 
 
higher commodity prices, which means our estimates might overestimate the production cost 
impact.  To what extent that the cost impact could be passed to consumer prices remains an 
empirical question requiring a national study.  Our estimates could be regarded as representing a 
short-term rather than a long-term impact fully accounting for market equilibrium effects.  
Farmers with much market experience perhaps need not to worry about at all the cost impact of 
CAT if production cost increase can be easily passed on to consumers, or need they? 
  Third, it would not be surprising if this study underestimated the agricultural potential of 
carbon offset provision.  The estimation of the agricultural potential to provide carbon offsets is 
based on our survey of farmer ex ante preferences.  As mentioned above, the on-farm potential of 
carbon offset provision is a new concept with which farmers do not have much experience.  A 
risk-averse farmer tends to overweight the uncertainty and risk for involving in a new production 
option, particularly if it requires a long-time commitment while subject to regulation.  As a 
result, while understanding that revenue from carbon offset provision would come together with 
rising production costs under GHG CAT, farmers were less willing to be involved in carbon 
programs, as indicated by our survey.  With this recognition, it is also economically reasonable 
to expect more active farmer involvement in carbon programs once the production cost impact 
becomes a sunk cost with an effective CAT climate policy and once farmers become more 
familiar with on-farm management that can produce both crop or animals and carbon offsets.  
After all, providing carbon offsets does not have to compete with crop or animal production 
(although they could under high carbon prices) and may more than offset the sunk cost of 
agricultural production under CAT while also bring other joint farm benefits such as increased 
soil fertility.                 
  Fourth, this study did not consider the environmental benefits or costs of GHG CAT.  
Studies have suggested that providing carbon offsets can bring many other environmental 
benefits or costs due to its implied change on land use and production practices (Jackson et al. 
2005, Pattanayak et al. 2005, Elbakidze and McCarl 2007, Feng et al. 2007).  These 
environmental benefits and costs arise from the effects of land use change on soil fertility, water 
quality, in-stream flow, wildlife habitat, biodiversity, and so on.  We did not incorporate these 
effects because this study is from the farmer perspective to maximize production profits and 
there is no market (except CRP or WRP) that currently exists to provide incentives for farmers to 25 
 
consider those benefits or costs.  If an environmental market can be established in combination 
with the carbon market that rewards provision of those farm environmental credits, different 
estimates of the benefits and costs of CAT may be expected.  
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Table 1.  Example of carbon credit programs included in survey questionnaire
a 
Carbon credit program
b  Available carbon credits  Market return rate 





c  0.4 metric ton/acre/year  $10/acre/year 
Cropland conversion to grass  1.0 metric ton/acre/year  $25/acre/year 
Rangeland management  0.12 metric ton/acre/year  $3/acre/year 
Tree planting
d  0.7-1.8 metric ton/acre/year
e  $17.5-45/acre/year 
Methane management   21 metric ton/metric ton 
methane/year 
$525/metric ton methane/year 
a.  Carbon credit programs are adopted from the voluntary programs managed by the National 
Farmer Union (2009) 
b.  All programs require at least 5 year commitment. 
c.  Including planting methods commonly referred to as: no till, strip till, direct seed, zero till, 
slot till, and zone till.   
d.  Tree planting may require a contract longer than 5 years. 
e.  Depending on tree age and species; at least 20 acres enrollment required. 
f.  Assume a carbon price of $25/metric ton.  
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Table 2.  Definition of independent variables  
Independent Variable  Definition 
EnrollDummy  Choice specific dummy, 1 indicating carbon program enrollment and 0 
otherwise 
Price  Specified market price for per metric ton of sequestered carbon 
Farming  Land use dummy, 1 denoting land in crop farming and 0 otherwise  
Rangeland  Land use dummy, 1 denoting rangeland management and 0 otherwise 
CRP  Land use dummy, 1 denoting CRP land and 0 otherwise 
NW  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the northwest region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
NC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the north central region of ND and 0 
otherwise  
NE  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the northeast region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
WC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the west central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
CT  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
EC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the east central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
SW  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the southwest region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
SC  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the south central region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
SE  Farm location dummy, 1 denoting the southeast region of ND and 0 
otherwise 
Ownland  Land tenure dummy, 1 denoting owning farmland and 0 otherwise  
Rentland  Land tenure dummy, 1 denoting renting farmland and 0 otherwise 
Agel45  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of 45 years old or younger and 
0 otherwise 
Age4659  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of 46 to 59 years old and 0 
otherwise 
Ageg60  Age group dummy, 1 denoting the group of over 60 years old and 0 
otherwise 
FExpl10  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting less than 10 years of experience 
and 0 otherwise 
FExp11-19  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting 11 to 19 years of experience 
and 0 otherwise 
FExpg20  Farming experience dummy, 1 denoting more than 20 years of 
experience and 0 otherwise 
ClimA  Farmer attitude dummy, 1 denoting being concerned about climate 
change and 0 otherwise 
ClimAP   Farmer attitude dummy, 1 denoting supporting climate legislation and 0 
otherwise 
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Table 3.  Estimated coefficient parameters for the binary logit model of farmer choice to 
participate in carbon credit programs and estimated elasticities of the probability of carbon 
program participation with respect to farmer attributes.   
Independent Variable  Estimated Coefficient   Standard Error  Choice Elasticity
a  
EnrollDummy  -4.8371
***  0.9673   
Price                0.0329
***  0.0087  0.5381
*** 
Farming                0.5386  0.4278         0.2538 
CRP                1.1145
***  0.3741  0.5103
*** 
Rangeland                1.2091
***  0.3664  0.5562
*** 
NW                0.2307  0.6290         0.1083 
NC               -1.4858
**  0.7084        -0.6367
** 
NE               -0.3916  0.6349        -0.1850 
WC                0.8428
  0.7508         0.3735
 
EC                0.0315  0.6893         0.0149 
SW               -0.0654   0.6856        -0.0309 
SC                0.7058  0.6855         0.3196 
SE               -0.8671   0.6358        -0.4007 
Ownland                1.5954
***  0.6609         0.6779
*** 
Rentland              -0.7575
**  0.4113        -0.3513
** 
Agel45                1.3405
***  0.5428  0.5784
*** 
Ageg60              -0.2815  0.3784        -0.1331 
FExpg20                0.9280
**  0.4712         0.4306
** 
ClimA                0.8139
**  0.3675         0.3783
** 
ClimAP                 0.8038




            -121.066 
75% 
   
a.  For dummy variables, the elasticity estimates were calculated as: 
0 0 1 Pr / ) Pr (Pr     
where Pr1 is the probability estimated with the focal variable being 1 and all other 
variables at their sample means; and Pr0 is the probability estimated with the focal 
variable being 0 and all other variables at their sample means.  For carbon price, the 
elasticity estimate was calculated as:  
100 /
/ 1





   
where Pr1 is the probability estimated with the carbon price being 1 plus its sample mean 
and all other variables at their sample means; and Pr0 is the probability estimated with all  
variables at their sample means. 
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Table 4.  Estimated production cost function for per unit farmland for ND   
Independent variable  Coefficient estimate  Standard error 
Intercept                     11.0934
***  3.5023 
Natural gas price                     21.9175
***  3.2773 
Natural gas price square                      -1.2955
***  0.3323 
Crude oil price                      -1.3347
***  0.4405 
Crude oil price square                       0.0191
***  0.0042 
Adjusted R square                       0.91   
 
   33 
 
Table 5.  Summary of 2007 ND agricultural census data used in policy simulation  
Agricultural attributes  Number of farms  Total acreage 
    Farms  31,970  37,830,203
a 
Land use and management     
    Harvested cropland  20,408  22,035,717 
    Cropland only used for pasture or grazing   4,025  812,553 
    Cropland failed or abandoned  2,855  530,496 
    Cropland in cultivated summer fallow  3,443  598,516 
    Permanent pasture and rangeland  14,964  10,418,885 
    Land in conservation   15,253  3,434,036 
Land tenure     
    Own land  29,099  19,977,605 
    Rent land  15,667  19,696,981 
Principle operator age group     
    Less than 45 years    6,376  NA 
    45 to 59 years  12,707  NA 
    60 years and over  12,887  NA 
Data source: USDA (2010) 
a.  Only include the land listed by land use and management, which accounts for 95% of the 
total farmland in ND. 
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Table 6.  Mapping of farmland and carbon credit programs to enroll by land use and 
management 
Farmland type by use and management  Carbon credit program to enroll 
Harvested cropland  Conservation tillage 
Cropland used only for pasture or grazing  Rangeland management 
Cropland failed or abandoned  Cropland conversion to grass 
Cropland in cultivated summer fallow  Cropland conversion to grass 
Permanent pasture or rangeland  Rangeland management 
Land in Conservation   Tree planting 
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Table 7.  Simulated acreages of farmland enrolled in carbon credit programs and amounts of carbon sequestered in ND for different 
carbon prices 
Carbon Price, 
$/metric ton  Conservation tillage  Cropland to grass   Rangeland manage.  Tree planting  Total acreage 
Acreages of farmland enrolled, acres (%) 
5  3,838,603 (45.16)  219,064 (2.58)  3,541,668 (41.67)  900,610 (10.60)  8,499,944 (100) 
10  4,278,357 (45.65)  243,825 (2.60)  3,857,951 (41.17)  990,954 (10.57)  9,371,086 (100) 
15  4,750,463 (46.15)  270,359 (2.63)  4,185,504 (40.67)  1,086,089 (10.55)  10,292,416 (100) 
20  5,254,599 (46.66)  298,642 (2.65)  4,522,346 (40.16)  1,185,650 (10.53)  11,261,237 (100) 
30  6,355,359 (47.69)  360,221 (2.70)  5,214,578 (39.13)  1,396,067 (10.48)  13,326,225 (100) 
50  8,871,016 (49.80)  500,112 (2.81)  6,598,593 (37.04)  1,842,960 (10.35)  17,812,681 (100) 
70  11,614,935 (51.87)  651,478 (2.91)  7,843,993 (35.03)  2,279,955 (10.18)  22,390,362 (100) 
Amounts of carbon sequestered, metric ton/year (%) 
5  1,535,441 (46.45)  219,064 (6.63)  425,000 (12.86)  1,125,762 (34.06)  3,305,267 (100) 
10  1,711,343 (46.80)  243,825 (6.67)  462,954 (12.66)  1,238,692 (33.87)  3,656,814 (100) 
15  1,900,185 (47.15)  270,359 (6.71)  502,260 (12.46)  1,357,612 (33.68)  4,030,417 (100) 
20  2,101,840 (47.50)  298,642 (6.75)  542,682 (12.26)  1,482,062 (33.49)  4,425,225 (100) 
30  2,542,144 (48.21)  360,221 (6.83)  625,749 (11.87)  1,745,083 (33.09)  5,273,197 (100) 
50  3,548,406 (49.67)  500,112 (7.00)  791,831 (11.08)  2,303,700 (32.25)  7,144,049 (100) 
70  4,645,974 (51.12)  651,478 (7.17)  941,279 (10.36)  2,849,944 (31.36)  9,088,675 (100) 
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a  Production cost increase, $/acre (%)
b 
Natural gas  Crude oil  Fert. industry exempted  Fert. industry capped 
5  1%  1%  0.54 (0.69)  1.14 (1.45) 
10  3%  2%  1.09 (1.38)  2.28 (2.91) 
15  4%  3%  1.63 (2.08)  3.43 (4.36) 
20  5%  4%  2.18 (2.77)  4.57 (5.81) 
30  8%  6%  3.26 (4.15)  6.85 (8.72) 
50  14%  10%  5.44 (6.92)  11.42 (14.53) 
70  19%  14%  7.62 (9.69)  15.99 (20.34) 
a.  Energy price increases are relative to the 2009 price levels.  The estimates are based on 
the carbon content of energy sources as if a carbon tax was posed on energy prices 
without considering the market equilibrium effect of carbon pricing. 
b.  The percentage in parenthesis is relative to the 2009 annual average of variable 
production cost for per unit land in ND.     
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Data Source: energy prices from EIA (2010), production costs from USDA ERS (2010) 
Figure 1.  Historical observations of annual averages of energy prices and variable production 
cost for per unit land in ND.  
 
















































































































Variable Production Cost, $/acre
Natural Gas Price, $/10000 cubic meter
Crude Oil Price, $/bbl38 
 
 
Figure 2.  Relationship of ND variable production costs for per unit land with natural gas and 
crude oil prices 
 
   

































Energy Price, $/104feet3for natural gas, $/bbl for crude oil
Variable production cost attributed to natural gas price variable production cost attributed to crude oil price
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2009 level of natural gas price
2009 level of crude oil price39 
 
 
Figure 3.  Aggregate revenues from carbon offset provision and marginal production costs to ND 
farms for different carbon prices.   
 




































Carbon Price, $/metric ton carbon
Carbon squestration revenue
Production cost impact 
(fertilizer industry exempted)
Production cost impact 
(fertilizer industry capped)40 
 
 




b.  Fertilizer industry exempted 
 
Figure 4.  Cumulative distributions of marginal farm profits by farms for ND for different carbon 
prices 




















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton


















































  I: Carbon price = $5/metric ton
 II: Carbon price = $25/metric ton
III: Carbon price = $45/metric ton
IV: Carbon price = $65/metric ton41 
 
 
a.  Fertilizer industry capped 
 
b.  Fertilizer industry exempted 
 
Figure 5.  Cumulative distributions of marginal farm profits by acreage for ND for different 
carbon prices   
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